After Benazir Bhutto
Published by Haseeb December 28th, 2007 in Current News, PakistanFor more on the state of affairs in Pakistan, keep reading PakistanPolicy.com
Source: Comment Is Free
Bhutto’s murder need not result in Pakistan’s demise. If the country’s elite succeed in bringing about renewal she will not have died in vain
The assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto has brought Pakistan’s state of turmoil to new heights. As head of the nation’s most popular political party, Bhutto largely transcended Pakistan’s ethnic and sectarian divides. Her return from exile in October was seen as a step toward curbing the country’s dangerous fragmentation; her murder shatters those hopes. President Pervez Musharraf must take immediate steps - most importantly, the formation of a national unity government - to prevent Pakistan from tearing apart at the seams.
In deciding that her People’s party would participate in the January parliamentary election, Bhutto threw a lifeline to Musharraf, who has been beset by multiple insurgencies, a nationwide terrorist threat, and rock-bottom legitimacy. Both Musharraf and his supporters in Washington hoped that mainstream parties’ participation in the election would end Pakistan’s governance crisis and provide popular support for a decisive confrontation with the Taliban and al-Qaida.
Now, however, the election will likely be postponed. Indeed, Musharraf might be compelled to impose emergency rule again, as he did in November, should Pakistan’s stability further deteriorate. There are reports of violence in cities across Pakistan. Karachi, a multi-ethnic metropolis, could erupt into full-scale chaos. During the 1990’s, violence there between Bhutto’s party and a local ethnic party - now allied with Musharraf - took thousands of lives.
In these circumstances, a state of emergency could be warranted. But, given Musharraf’s lack of legitimacy, such a move would further infuriate Bhutto’s supporters, whose street power Bhutto had contained since October. This could set the stage for a violent confrontation between the Pakistani masses and Musharraf’s regime.
The nightmare scenario envisioned by many in Pakistan - a nuclear-armed country actively targeted by al-Qaida and the Taliban - could become a reality. But this need not be a foregone conclusion.
Musharraf, who regularly claims to act on the basis of a “Pakistan first” policy, must now let go of partisan objectives and form a national unity government led by a prime minister from the opposition. Any subsequent measures, including temporary imposition of emergency rule and full-scale war against the terrorists, require the complete support of the opposition parties. Musharraf and his political allies cannot be seen as benefiting from Bhutto’s assassination; nor can they afford the perception of a cover-up. His opponents must be incorporated into the decision-making process.
A national unity government must assume three major responsibilities. First, it must establish an independent commission to determine who was responsible for Bhutto’s murder. While political assassination is not unfamiliar - Pakistan’s first prime minister was killed in the same park where Bhutto was murdered - it is imperative that the culprits be apprehended and tried. Anything short of this would permanently taint Pakistan’s leadership and impede all attempts at political reconciliation.
Second, it must take necessary measures to ensure public safety and political stability, while paving the way for free and fair elections. It must offer Pakistan a consensual path toward winning back its tribal areas from the insurgents, end the wave of terror in its cities, and ensure the election of a new, legitimate government.
Finally, it must begin a dialogue with Musharraf and the military on a permanent, constitutional separation of powers. If Bhutto had not been assassinated and, instead, successfully became prime minister, she would likely have clashed with Musharraf over his arbitrary empowerment of the presidency at the expense of the premiership. The issue will not go away with Bhutto’s death.
Pakistan’s civil and military elite must create a broad consensus - perhaps with foreign assistance, but never with foreign meddling - on the constitutional roles of the prime minister, president, and the military. Ravaged by endemic elite discord since its founding, Pakistan desperately needs an elite reconciliation that includes all of the country’s major stakeholders. Otherwise, Pakistan’s terrorists, who feed off of political instability, will continue to gain, while the country’s poor and illiterate majority will continue to lose ground.
The murder of Benazir Bhutto need not result in the country’s demise. Pakistan’s elite have an opportunity to overcome their differences, unite in opposition to militants, and transform their failing state into a stable and prosperous democracy.
If they succeed in bringing about a national renewal, Bhutto, a monumental political figure in Pakistani history, will not have died in vain.
In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2007.
i strongly disagree with this opinion piece.
there is no doubt that the assassination of benazir bhutto is a major setback for pakistan. it plunges the country into further intrigue, destabilization and bloody conflict.
however, let us not use this opportunity to distort history. although, the people’s party is currently the most popular political party in pakistan, it does not bring any new strategy to tackle pakistan’s growing problems. in fact, we are guaranteed an intensification of musharraf’s confrontational approach which has led the country to its current lowest point.
the article also seems to imply that the first ‘emergency’ (in truth the second martial law) imposed by musharraf was in response to a security situation. in fact, as acknowledged by all national and international media, the actual reason for the imposition of emergency was to curb the powers of the judiciary which was becoming too independent and was challenging musharraf’s power and policies.
pakistani terrorists feed off political instability? it is obvious that any opponent would exploit weaknesses in the system. however, the political instability is a relatively recent phenomenon. while extremism has been growing steadily for several years. the real weakness being exploited by extremists is not political instability but democratic deficit. the musharraf government, and any future establishment that come to power in collusion with musharraf, will inevitably suffer this handicap since musharraf has throughly discredited himself by failing to even attempt to take the nation into confidence over key issues.
therefore, i believe that a secure future for pakistan does not lie by way of compromise with the current administration. in fact, it lies with those parties that have been calling for a boycott of the proposed elections under a farce judiciary manipulated by musharraf.
finally, a constitutional division of powers is well out-lined in the pakistani constitution. all major political parties (even the rival PPP and PML(n) ) are agreed on this issue. nobody is searching for a new division in this setup other than musharraf who has only personal interests to protect.
As author of the piece, I’d like to respond to your comments, which I feel were excellent, but misunderstood some of my points.
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Agreed.
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Possible, but that’s a scenario I hope can be avoided. If Musharraf becomes more confrontational, then Pakistan is headed toward a 1971-esque situation.
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Wrong. Here’s what I wrote: “Indeed, Musharraf might be compelled to impose emergency rule again, as he did in November, should Pakistan’s stability further deteriorate.”
I didn’t state that November’s ER was justified. I wrote that imposition of ER would be a repetition of the act done in November, not in the same context.
I opposed the imposition of ER. Check out my op-ed in the Baltimore Sun: http://pakistanpolicy.com/2007/11/06/op-ed-pakistan-suffering-from-musharrafs-misdirected-wrath/
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Agreed. I believe Musharraf squandered whatever legitimacy he had left in November. I called on him to step down from office.
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Ok — you agree with me.
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You have it somewhat in the inverse. Political instability has been endemic in Pakistan — it’s as old as the country itself. Liaquat Ali Khan was murdered in 51. Pakistan got its first constitution in 56. That was torn up two years later. Thus began the cycle of military dictatorship and civilian kleptocracy. Show me a smooth transition of power.
The radicalism is what is new. It began to target Pakistan itself in the 90s with Sipah-e Sahaba, etc. Now it’s metastasized into the Pakistani Taliban and other groups.
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I agree that democratic governance and the rule of law are the ultimate solutions to the rise of militancy. But that requires not only the absence of military dictatorship and interference in politics, but a civilian political class that also adheres to civil, democratic norms. The point is they’re all pretty shabby — civilian and military — and they ALL need to come up with and adhere to the rules of the game.
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I do not support the current administration. If your belief becomes a fact, then all the better.
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Which parties? Tehreek-e Insaf? A party of one? Unfortunate, since Pakistan would benefit from a stronger TI. Jamaat-e Islami? Zia’s allies?
Remember, the PML-N bit the bullet and jumped in the polls after their Charter of Demands talks with the PPP fell apart. Nawaz Sharif’s rhetoric has been admirable. If he’s a changed man, then that is great. But remember he’s the one whose goons attacked the Supreme Court and chief justice in 1997.
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Ah, only if the 1973 constitution were respected by anyone. It’s an excellent document — and the product of the type of consensus Pakistan needs today. But it has been raped by civilian and military alike. It’s been tattered by self-aggrandizing amendments made by military and civilian rulers. And civilians team up with the army chief of staff against their civilian competitors. I’m not talking just about the Chaudhries and other lotay. Both BB and Nawaz played the game and used the military-intel apparatus against their opponents and one another.
If the PPP stuck with the PML-N on the Charter of Democracy, that would’ve been great. But the fact is is that there is no trust among the political parties. Moreover, the military played a political role even when the PPP and PML-N were in power. Who made the IJI?
In the end, my point is that they are all flawed. They must all be incorporated into a system in which the rules of the game are detailed and respected. That system must be based on the 1973 constitution….but how do you jump from a hybrid system to a parliamentary democracy overnight? How do you institute civilian oversight over the military budget overnight? How do you ensure that opposition parties, should the PPP or PML-N come into power, don’t collaborate with the military against those in pwr — extrasystemically?
Ah, the posting cut out my quotes from your comments. My response was chronological. So I don’t think you’ll have trouble following.